MT - 4. Sources of Morality

4. Sources of Morality


A human act, just because it is human (qua human) does not become moral. Morality is a quality of the action, based on its relationship to norms of behaviour, i.e. moral law. If it is positively related, the act is morally good, if it deviates from the norm it is morally bad, and if it has no special relevant to the norms of morality, the act is indifferent. Hence an act becomes moral as far as morality flows into that or it is permeated with moral quality. Then comes the question, in what respect an act is related to the moral norm. These various aspects through which and act is related to the moral norm and through which, the act is morally accessed are called the sources of morality. They could also be called the determinacy of morality; however we stick to the traditional usage.

The sources of morality are three: Object, Intention and Circumstances.

1. Object

Object is that towards which an act is directly and primarily ordained. It is described in various ways: the immediate and necessary effect of an act, something without which the act can’t be said to be done, that by which an act is usually labelled. In short object is the end of act. For e.g. killing, which is depriving someone of his life; stealing, appropriating another’s property against his will; cheating, misleading somebody with the intention to deceive and so on. This shows that the object is inherent in the very act.

Object is the primary determinant of the moral species of the act, namely morally good, morally bad or morally indifferent. Therefore when we say killing is wrong, killing is objectively wrong. Object is the primary determinant. This is so because it is part of the very act and the act does not take place at all without realizing the object. Why? Intention and circumstance are very much external to the act as such. As we know the same act, killing, can be done with various intentions and under various circumstances while object remains same. Besides primacy of the objects ensures objectivity of morality; otherwise morality would be very much subjective and everyone’s intention may be the dominating factor in the assessment of morality. In the catholic tradition, objectively bad act are also known as intrinsically bad act, i.e. bad from within, and such act are always and everywhere forbidden. Note that objectively bad acts are intrinsically bad and never allowed. They are also called moral absolutes. (This has given rise to continuing discussions even today.)

2. Intention

Intention is the end or purpose for which an act is done. Usually this is in addition to the object of the act. For e.g. A kills B in order to prevent the latter from bearing witnessing against him. It also follows that the similar act can be done with different intentions. Intention is an important source of morality, though 2nd, because it is the manifestation of inner morality or moral orientation of the person. The motivation for which something is done is always seriously taken I the assessment of the moral quality of the act.

A steals something for his own use, while B does so only to help a poor man. Though both are stealing, the moral assessment differs, the first more culpable than the second. Intention as a rule does not change the moral species of the act, already determined by the object; but can modify the morality of the act by enhancing or diminishing the moral goodness or badness of the act or even changing an indifferent act to a good or bad act. A good intention for e.g. makes a good act better. It makes a bad act, less bad and makes an indifferent act good. On the contrary, a bad intention makes a bad act worse, good act less good and an indifferent act bad.

3. Circumstances

Circumstances, which answer various questions like where, when also may affect the morality of the act in the 3rd place. They may be called positive or negative rather than good or bad. Their influence on act is similar to that of intention, usually in a less serious way.

The principle of Double Effect

There are several actions which in fact bring about 2 or more effects, one good and the other bad. We may not simply do them because there is good, primarily because they bring about evil; nor can we simply omit them, for by that we miss the occasions for safeguarding important values. Hence we have to proceed carefully about it. The principle of double effect deals with the legitimacy of such actions providing certain conditions. If all the following conditions are fulfilled the act may legitimately be done otherwise not.

The following are the conditions:

1. The act should not be bad in itself, i.e. we should not aim at bringing about something good, by doing something which is objectively bad or bad in itself. There is an important moral principle; you may not do evil, in order to achieve good. The action may be good, but then its prospect about bringing about evil, is very little. Therefore usually the action is presumed to be indifferent.
2. Bad effect may not be directly intended, but only tolerated. This is a question of the orientation of the will of the agent. When we tolerate something, we are allowing it, because we are helpless; or there is no other way out. In intention our will immediately goes after an object.
3. There should be proportion or equality between good and the bad effect; or between the values saved and the value lost. Values can’t be easily weighed and compared, but we have to do that prudently. This is in fact the justification for bringing about certain evil.
4. Both the effect should come equally immediately from the act. What is meant is not chronological immediacy but caused immediacy. Good effect and bad effect truly come about from the act. Anyway one shall not first bring about the evil and then try to gain the good by means of the evil. This also goes against the principles said earlier. i.e. “end does not justify means”.

The principle of double effect is the principle to be applied to solve conflict situations (where values clash) in traditional moral theology.

The three font theory, especially the principle of double effect has been a topic under debate for some time among catholic moral theologians and some of them strongly criticized certain aspects of the traditional position. The position of the critics may be summarized as follows:

Act of killing is supposed to be something objectively bad and never allowed. However it is justified in self defence or in the process of defending one’s country many people are killed. All this is justified under the plea that it is for self defence. The critics agree to that, but killing is justified and justified by virtue of intention. Hence even traditional moral theology, which emphasises the role of the object at least in certain situations given prominence to intention, in such a way the evil contained in the object, is neutralized. They further argue that there are several other cases like this. For e.g. telling lies, which is intrinsically evil, in order to save an innocent life, therefore they divide moral norms into material and synthetic. Material is uncritical different of the norm, like do not kill, do not steal and so on. As we have seen in this sense they can have exceptions and therefore not intrinsically evil. However the same norms can be redefined in such a way that exceptions are excluded. For e.g. do not kill the innocent; don’t deny truth to the one who has a right to it by speaking against your mind, for lie. Such critical re-formulation known as synthetic are intrinsically evil.

Another agreement of critic is that the traditional morality holds that an objectively good act, if done solely and totally for a bad intention, the act becomes bad, again intention changing the object nature of the act. They also bring in philosophical agreement compared between them “an end is more important than means”. In the object-intention relationship, intention has the place of the end and object has that of a means. Hence the importance of intention should be recognized duly among the determinants of morality. Further, action like organ’s transplantation which implies mutilation to the donor is justified by the motive of charity implied in such actions, again showing the importance of intention. Hence they argue that in accessing the morality of an act intention should be given equal importance like object. Therefore the moral species of an act shall not be a priori determined by the nature of object alone; the nature of the intention should also be considered as equally important. Circumstances are not neglected but usually they are not so prominent. Consequently if the object and intention of an act is good, it may very well be done; if both are bad, it shall not be done. If object is good and the intention is bad, again both the traditional theory and critic would not allow them. Therefore differences of opinion between two positions become conspicuous, which is objectively bad, but proposed to be done for a good intention. Traditional morality would not allow it.

Critics would say that its legitimacy would depend on the proportion between the good effect and bad effect; if a value saved is equal to or more than the value lost, the action is to be considered legitimate on the contrary, if the value lost is more serious, weightier more important etc. then the value gained it is immoral. Since proportion plays a big role in the theory which is known as proportionalism.

Even when such an act is legitimate, some evil is produced through the action of the agent and that is called pre-moral evil and justified through the proportionate good. In the absence of proportion the evil caused is really moral evil and that should not be done. That means if there is no proportion, the act shall not be done.

Let us note a few critical observations about proportionalism. First of all, it does away with the concept of intrinsically evil and does not hold that an objectively bad act is by itself always and everywhere forbidden. It also denies traditional moral principle “End does not justify means”, or “”You may not do evil, in order to attain good”. This position destabilizes the foundation of the objective morality. Anything becomes allowable on the condition of proportion. By giving prominence to intention it leads to subjectivism, because each ones intention becomes the dominant factor at least in conflict situation. Subjectivism leads to relativism in morality. In this context each one may have his own criteria for deciding the morality of one or another act. In the objection that proportionalism denies “the end does not justify means” principle, they say what is forbidden is doing morally evil act, not pre-moral. This however is a twisting of traditional understanding of the principle; but they justify themselves in this manner. It is said that comparing values is very difficult, that it is comparing fruits. It means people judge the quality of fruits according to their personal taste and needs, and this risk prevails in proportionalism increasing the measure of its subjectivism and relativism. However proportionalism retorts that comparison of values is a condition in double effect. However in double effect, there are other conditions which ensure that one does not choose an objectively bad act as a means for good, while in proportionalism there is no caution like that and hence comparison becomes morally much more risky.

Pope John Paul II has strongly cautioned against the application of proportionalism, though it is not condemned. Perhaps it can be more critically studied and developed so that subjectivism and relativism is controlled and consequently becomes a viable theory. As of now the principle to be used in conflict situation is the principle of double effect.